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Abstract
Picking up on Marx’s and Hegel’s analyses of human beings as social and individual,
the article shows that what is at stake is not merely the possibility of individuality,
but also the correct conception of the universal good. Both Marx and Hegel suppose
that individuals must be social or political as individuals, which means, at least in
Hegel’s case, that particular interests must form part of the universal good. The
good and the rational is not something that requires sacrificing one’s interests for the
community or denying one’s particular character so as to become an equal rational
agent. Very much to the contrary, the rational or the common good is nothing but
the harmonious structuring of particular interests. While Section I introduces Marx’s
and Hegel’s conceptions of individual and social beings, Sections II and III discuss
their respective views of individuality, and Sections IV and V discuss the notion of a
universal good containing individual interests.
Marx famously proposes that citizens of the modern state live a ‘double life, a
heavenly one and an earthly one’—one in which they exist as ‘communal beings’
and one in which they live as ‘private persons’ (MEW 1: 355).1 Hegel suggests in
a similar manner that individuals contain a ‘dual moment’ (PR: §264, 287). While
scholars like Hardimon (1994) and Neuhouser (2000) have looked into Hegel’s
conception of humans as individual and social beings, a central aspect of his
reasoning has gone unnoticed—and it is precisely the one that Marx’s criticism
gets at. The point is not merely that human beings are both social and individual,
and that society should enable their individuality and connect both roles (cf.
Hardimon 1994: 164ff.). Marx’s worry is not merely a psychological one, pointing
to a form of self-alienation. His is a much more social or practical concern. Marx
criticizes the concept of a two-sided individual, on the grounds that the one who
has a say in or, at least, endorses political decisions is not the same person who
acts, lives and has interests in the private sphere. Basically, Marx is claiming that if
there is any distinction between humans as social and individual beings, then a
society is necessarily only formally democratic and consensual, while the
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common good remains an empty phrase unconnected to what actual individuals
want and need for themselves.
Hegel and Marx are both systemic thinkers, with a keen interest in the
functioning of social structures and institutions. It is precisely this awareness of
the power of social systems and structures—the fact that they do not take
individuality as a given, unproblematic starting point—that makes their
discussion interesting. For Hegel and Marx, individuality must be treated more
like a problem than a fact. The question of individuality concerns not only how
individuality is possible within society, but also what political demands can be
derived from individuality, and, more precisely, what role individuals should play
in political decision-making and the definition of the universal good. If one
regards human beings as instances of the same human essence, then the common
good can be conceived as what furthers that essence (even if it is brought about
by a benevolent dictator), or as what the majority of individuals decide by equal
vote (supposing that the majority is most likely to grasp what is good for all).
If you believe that human beings are diverse (or that this is required for their
individuality), then you not only confront the problem of how this diversity is
both enabled and threatened by society; you also have to acknowledge that
individuals tend to have different or even opposing interests, which makes it
much harder to say what would be best for all and implies that a majority vote
necessarily misrepresents the diversity of interests.
Both critics and supporters of Hegel tend to interpret his state in terms of
rational aims and plans according to which individuals are ordered by a
benevolent government that knows what is rational or beneficial for individuals.
Taylor (1975: 439) suggests the state is rational and individual freedom requires
‘identifying with this larger life’. In Franco’s words, ‘the state is the objective
embodiment of that substantiality and rationality that represents the deepest
essence in human beings’ (Franco 1999: 282). Patten (1999: 192) proposes that
freedom requires ‘subjectively identifying with the good of the community as a
whole’. Pippin and Patten additionally claim that the state enables individuals to
distance themselves from their immediate interests and desires, thereby becoming
rational agents (Pippin 2008: 192; 2000: 160).
Both interpretations boil down to the demand that individuality—the
particular interests, distinct needs and desires of individuals—must be excluded
from the state, either by changing the individuals themselves or by having them
endorse something whose value is not immediately linked to their personal
well-being. Even Hardimon (1994: 211), who stresses the idea of a collective
deliberative process, suggests that the common good is different from egoistic
interests.2 Neuhouser maintains that only a disinterested elite can know the
common good (Neuhouser 2002: 202, cf. 130f.). In fact, Neuhouser’s
proposition is only fitting: Normal citizens certainly do not, or do not
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necessarily, know the common good, if the reason that it is good is not down to
an increase in their personal well-being, but rather some ethical or rational
standard. Individuals can know this standard, it is supposed, only insofar as they
are social beings and manage to abstract from their individuality—which entails
the odd proposition that some individuals can be more social than others. This is
precisely Marx’s worry. Paraphrasing George Orwell’s Animal Farm, just as no pig
can be ‘more equal’ than others, so no individual can be ‘more social’ than others.
That human beings are social and individual does not mean that they have two
sides, which can be more or less developed. Rather, they are social as individuals;
Marx demands that they should therefore be political decision-makers as
individuals with their distinct interests, views, needs and desires.
While there is some basis for the interpretations of Hegel mentioned above,
the present article will show that there are also very good reasons for reading
Hegel as addressing precisely the issue Marx has raised—and, I believe, more
successfully so. Marx thwarts his own aim of making individuals have a say in
politics by under-developing the notion of individuality and how it is enabled by
society. Hegel, on the contrary, provides a more realistic take on the possibility of
individuality and shows how individual and group differences can make a
meaningful contribution to political decision-making and the definition of the
common good. To make this argument, I will first clarify the conception of
individuality and sociality which the two authors have (I). I will then address the
two aspects of the problem of individuality: first, how individuality is possible
within society (II, III); and, second, how individual differences need to inform
the common good for Marx and Hegel (IV, V).
I. The particularity and universality of human beings
In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel proposes that individuals have two moments.
They are a ‘singularity that knows and wills itself as separate ( für sich)’ and a
‘universality that knows and wills the substantial’ (PR: §264, 287). As a first
approximation one can say the particular aspect of individuals involves their
ability to distinguish themselves from society, their awareness of being an
individual, in the end: someone unique or ‘singular’, completely and
incomparably different from anyone else. The universal aspect involves the
individual’s awareness that society or whatever surrounds her is also a
constitutive element of herself. In terms of subjective development, the capacity
to use language and to develop certain ways of comprehending the world can
only evolve in communication with others and in a society that provides one with
complex objects of thought. Additionally, in order to exist as a thinking being not
merely inside one’s own mind, somebody must notice the thoughts one has
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expressed. Alone in the jungle, a human being would neither in her own thinking
evolve to be fully human, nor would she exist as a thinking being beyond her own
mind, because no animal would notice that she is not merely enacting immediate
instincts.3
While this provides a first approximation, it is important not to be misled in
two respects. First, Hegel is speaking not merely of states of mind, but of what
individuals ‘know and will ’. Hegel is thus speaking of what human beings act
upon or what they decide and bring about collectively, thereby transforming it
into a social reality. It is for this reason that Marx’s account of the ‘individual’ and
‘species life’ of human beings (MEW 40: 539) is so relevant. The early Marx
proposes that, in a post-capitalist society, the ‘species’ or ‘communal being’
of individuals refers to their ‘equal participation in popular sovereignty’
(MEW 1: 354). Human beings are universal in the sense that they see themselves
as part of a community and enact this knowledge by participating in communal
affairs or law making. Both Marx and Hegel attribute a particular importance
to this communal life of individuals: Marx describes it as the true human nature
(cf. MEW 1: 355, 408), and Hegel speaks of the ‘destiny of individuals’
(PR: §258, 276).
Second, while Hegel presents the two moments as opposites, they should
not be misunderstood as two sides of individuals or two distinct ways in which
they can think and interact with others. Rather, the two moments are
contradictory aspects of one and the same relation that individuals have to
society. This is, in a way, the central thesis of the present article, which will need
to be proven over its course. For the moment it should merely be noted that
‘willing oneself as separate’ and ‘willing the universal’ are not necessarily mutually
exclusive options. It is very well possible that being a distinguishable individual is
only possible by identifying with one or several groups and social activities, and
that wanting the common good cannot take any other form than wanting one’s
individual well-being—and agreeing to negotiate with other interest groups.
Interestingly, while Marx is the one who insists that communal and individual
lives must coincide, his conception of both appears to be much simpler than
Hegel’s, as this article will show.
II. The private individual and Marx’s inexpressible particular
For Hegel, ‘the individual actualizes herself only in becoming something definite,
i.e. something determined and particularized’ (PR: §207, 238). Each human being
must be a specific human being, with interests, experiences and arbitrary choices
of her own. Otherwise, she would not exist as an individual. This so-called
‘particular’ aspect of human beings is lived, for example, in economic relations: Hegel
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starts his Philosophy of Right by discussing the arbitrary choices made when exchanging
private property. Each individual’s arbitrary choices are likely to differ from the
choices of the next person, and they are present and visible in the form of her
particular pieces of property. (That consumerism is a potent form of expressing and
experiencing one’s individuality is today even more obvious than it must have been in
Hegel’s time).
While Marx famously disagrees with Hegel on the question of private
property, he also points out in The German Ideology that capitalism means
progress for the individual, since the ‘personal individual’ is discovered in the
private realm:
A nobleman always remains a nobleman, a commoner always
remains a commoner, apart from his other relationships [this
is] a quality that is inseparable from his individuality. The
difference between the personal individual and the class
individual, the accidental nature of the conditions of life for the
individual appears only with the emergence of a class that is the
product of the bourgeoisie. This accidental character is only
engendered and developed by competition and the struggle of
individuals among themselves. (MEW 3: 76)
For modern workers, there is a difference between their social role or profession
and their existence as individuals—simply because of the fact that they cannot
continue to do the same work for all of their lives. Competition and the lack of a
means of income beside their own bodies force them to continually look for a
new occupation, and it is mere chance as to where exactly they will end up
working. The individual worker is therefore conscious that her personality does
not coincide with her profession. This contrasts with the members of feudal
societies, where individuals are only the ‘specification of something universal’
(MEW 3: 75f.), namely their guild or estate. As Marx puts it in his Grundrisse,
‘individuals [are] imprisoned within a certain definition, as feudal lord and vassal,
landlord and serf, etc.’ (MEW 42: 96).
Marx welcomes the fact that capitalism introduces personal individuality,
because human beings stop identifying with a specific social role or group, ‘a
limited human conglomerate’ (MEW 42: 19), and are therefore able to identify
with their humanity in general, their quality as a species-being. The problem is
that one lives this personality only in the private and non-political realm. Marx
therefore demands the liberation of the individual from class individuality in all
spheres of life. Human beings should be like private persons in their productive
and political activities too; that is to say, human beings should be well aware that
none of their activities defines who they are. No one should have ‘one exclusive
sphere of activity’; everyone should fish, farm and criticize without being a fisher,
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farmer, or critic (MEW 3: 33); everybody should participate in the organization
of society in an equal manner (MEW 1: 253) and relate consciously to society as a
whole in all their manifold activities. Marx’s project in his early writings is to
overcome the imposed reduction of human beings to mere functions of society,
examples of social categories or groups. In fact, even in Capital Marx still
maintains this criticism, as he describes individuals as ‘bearers’ of social
functions, and proposes that communism has to enable the ‘full and free
development of each individual’ (MEW 23: 618).
But what kind of individuality is Marx actually proposing? In a slightly
unfair attack on Marx, one might ask: If nobody had an exclusive sphere of
activity, if everyone fished, farmed, criticized without being a fisher, farmer or
critic, participated equally in the organization of society—in what then would
their particularity consist? This human being can be defined as a person whom
none of its activities define socially, a particular to which no social categories
apply, an unspeakable particular, which all individuals equally are—in the end: a
universal. The very particular taken to the extreme is universal; claiming space for
the particular is not giving it any.
This problem seems to have escaped many Marxist writers. Marcuse simply
states that in communism all men have to exist as ‘universal beings’, and that ‘the
potentiality of the genus, Man’, will be realized (Marcuse 1967: 275). Lefebvre
claims that the ‘total man’ will be realized when ‘the subject who is broken up
into partial activities and scattered determination’ overcomes this ‘dispersion’
(Lefebvre 1969: 162). Neither of them pauses to consider whether individuality
would then continue to exist. They are concerned, as was Marx, with ‘human
emancipation’, human beings realizing their nature as species-beings. As Leopold
puts it: ‘A species-being is an individual who has actualized—that is, developed
and deployed—his essential capacities. By essential capacities, I mean those
capacities that characterize the species, rather than those that might distinguish
one person from another’ (Leopold 2007: 184). The question of individuality is
pushed into the background by Marx’s focus on the ‘universal development of
individuals’ (MEW 42: 91) in the sense of the development of all, as well as the
sense of an unfolding of all aspects of human activity in each.
Nevertheless, Marx clearly did not intend the term ‘particular species-being’
(MEW 40: 539) to be a contradiction in terms or contradictio in adjecto. He meant to
propose that human beings shall be species-beings and yet also particular in some
way and different from one another. The individual can be particularized socially,
either by having a specific social function, which would trigger Marx’s critique of
a limited individual, or by her arbitrary yet socially recognized self-determination
in a so-called private sphere. Individuals could also perform several social
functions, which together would define them in the eyes of society. However,
such a conception of a social being would again have to be rejected on the basis
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of Marx’s argument against a split individual. The particularity that Marx has in
mind must therefore refer to a certain naturally particular way in which one
human being is universal, i.e., relates consciously to society and unfolds her
manifold human abilities (cf. MEW 40: 539).
But is this enough for the particularity of one individual actually to exist?
The question may seem sophistical. After all, the fact that universals are needed
to particularize a specific thing or person only applies to how one must
necessarily think a particular, as opposed to how it is in itself, beyond knowledge.
However, Marx is talking about thinking beings. The way they are known by
others and see themselves coincides with how they exist as thinking beings. So to
restate the same question differently: is this naturally particular way of carrying
out one’s daily activities enough for the particularity of one individual to be
expressed in language, to be noticed by that very individual and others, and
to be respected in society? It may be supposed that Marx thinks it is. If Chitty
(2000: 182) is correct to propose that individuals recognize each other as species-
beings in mutual production, then the moment of particularity may lie with the
natural fact that, even though they all produce for society and carry out different
and changing activities, every product is physically distinct from the other.
However, this can only mark out one individual producer as different from the
next if you suppose an initial private property of each person’s product. In a
collective process of production, it will be hard or impossible to link any
particular product to any particular producer, both because of the similarity of
mass-produced items and because the process of production is communal and
involves several persons.
At bottom, Marx seems to be proposing that each individual can
accommodate in her own mind the fact that she is a social being and yet also
individual. For Hegel, as will be seen, a social definition of each individual is a
limitation (of her infinite possibilities of self-definition), but it is also a liberation
(of the particular will from an existence merely in terms of personal thoughts).
In fact, from a Hegelian viewpoint, Marx’s demand seems to have a similar status
to that which Hegel attributes to Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ and the moral
‘ought’ that derives from a supposed moral essence. Marx’s demand can be
paraphrased as saying: ‘Each individual shall produce in accordance with others
and without being reduced to one or several of her productive activities’. Such a
statement could well have the status of an ‘ought’ in Hegel’s terminology, in the
sense of an abstract demand that cannot be realized. This is so if one supposes
that, in their actual practical relations, human beings will necessarily distribute
tasks, even if it happens each day anew, and that individuals are bound to define
themselves and one another to some extent by means of the particular labours
they regularly or skilfully perform. That they shall not be defined by or limited to
one or many social activities therefore seems to rely on the conception of a
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human essence, a true human being with manifold abilities, which ought to, but
never can, actually exist in the world.
III. Individuality as defined by society, the estates individual
Consumerism certainly allows for a form of individuality for Hegel, as does what
Hegel misleadingly calls ‘moral subjectivity’, i.e., the enacting of personal projects,
intentions and aims, as well as one’s own conception of the universal good. Yet
the form of individuality that is socially most relevant pertains to social roles, in
particular one’s role as a professional and as a family member. These individual
identities are more relevant as they are more stable and less diverse than one’s
consumer decisions and intentions—individuals freely choose their profession
(PR: §262A, 286), but usually occupy it for some time, for Hegel. Additionally,
one’s identities as a professional and a family member are more likely to come
into systematic conflict with the interests of others. Both aspects make those
identities particularly interesting for Hegel. In the case of the family, Hegel is
optimistic that conflicts of interests are avoided by love and one’s immediate
identification with one’s role in the family. For this reason, professional groups
and interests are my main concern here.
Hegel supposes that individuals need to have distinct social roles in order to
be distinguishable and therefore individual. And yet he clearly shares Marx’s
concern about the split individual and the effects that such a split would have on
a conception of the common good. Hegel aims at preventing the problem that
the interests and actions of individuals as members of civil society are at odds
with their interests and actions as citizens and members of the political state. He
does so by making each individual a member of an estate or professional and
political grouping.
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right proposes that the best state requires not a
parliament with political parties, but an ‘assembly of estates’. The three estates are
landowners, the business class, and the bureaucracy. The business class is the
largest and most important class and it is divided into ‘corporations’ or
professional groups akin to medieval guilds, whose interests are represented by
delegates. While civil servants work in the executive and are not supposed to have
any agenda, the other two estates make up the ‘assembly of estates’, which is the
legislative body. There is some controversy as to how much power Hegel
envisaged this assembly to have. However, there are good reasons for believing
that the powers are very extensive: Besides making laws, the assembly also
approves of the budget (E3: §544, 144/343). Hegel also argues that the
estates coordinate their production and trading practices outside of parliament.
The state can regulate prices and even, if necessary, ‘determine everyone’s labor’
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(PR: §236, 262).4 The monarch for his part has the sole function of saying ‘yes’
(PR: §280A, 323), as Hegel famously claims. The king’s final decision is merely
symbolic, symbolizing the unity and free sovereignty or subjectivity of the state
(cf. PR: §273, 308f.).
What Hegel is sketching in the estates is clearly a particular universal
being—or, in Marx’s terms, a ‘particular species-being’ (MEW 40: 539). In fact,
the estates enable human beings to be universal (or social) and individual at the
same time, and they do so in three senses: (1) In the way pointed to, but
under-theorized by Marx, the estates make sure each person or rather group
participates in political decision-making in a particular manner. (2) Through
negotiations in the ‘assembly of estates’, professional groups are able to make
sure that their particular interests are taken into account when making laws and
formulating the common good. (3) Hegel supposes that just as individuals need
to be ‘particular universal beings’, so the public good in turn needs to be a
universal that contains particulars, i.e., egoistic group interests.
(1) For Hegel, estates and the corporations ‘mediate’ between ‘the people,
which is resolved into individuals’, and the government (PR: §302, 342). In them,
the individual ‘comes into existence for the state’ (PR: §301, 341). The estates
make the individual real as a social being primarily, as will be discussed in
(2), because individuals can express their particular interests. However, the estates
certainly also do so in the sense that different individuals participate in and
identify with the social whole in a different manner. Marx’s analysis presented
above also suggests that each individual is bound to have an individual way of
participating in the public good and in communal production. However, Marx
opposes the idea that society should define the individuality of each, i.e., the
specific and individual way in which one participates in law making and
production. Hegel, on the contrary, proposes that the individual ways human
beings participate in state affairs must themselves be social, i.e., defined by
society.
Hegel proposes that the agricultural estate is personally represented in the
legislative body, because agricultural property is handed down by birth and land
owners experience their social relations as personal relations (PR: §305f., 345f.).
The members of the business estate experience themselves in the market as
separate from other individuals, but they come to identify with associations of
shared economic interests. They are therefore represented by delegates, who
belong to the same economic group as they do (PR: §308, 346). Civil servants
work for the state primarily in executive functions (PR: §303, 343f.); these
individuals identify fully with the state, while knowing it and its ends.
When reading Hegel, Marx worries that individuals are bound to over-
identify with their social function. He thinks that individuals might work for the
state unconsciously like ants. Marx writes in his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right
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that the member of the estate is like ‘an animal that coincides immediately with its
determination’ (MEW 1: 285). In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx
then goes on to define species-life as opposed to this animal life: ‘The human being
makes her life activity the object of her will and consciousness’ (MEW 40: 516).
In other words, human beings must know themselves as different from their social
role. They have to reflect consciously on their social activities and, it may be
supposed, society as a whole and ‘will’ or enact their critical insights.
But which exact ability of human beings is at stake here? If Marx is pointing
to a psychological problem, then his case is quite weak and contradicts his own
observation regarding modern individuals being ‘split’ into many roles. Marx
himself has suggested that modern individuals have several distinct roles, which
seems to imply that they are well aware that none of those roles completely define
them. Hegel certainly links the particular roles they have in social production to a
particular way of participation in state affairs; additionally, for the smallest group
of citizens, namely civil servants, their working life and their political participation
immediately coincide. And yet, the individuals Hegel describes are nevertheless
modern in Marx’s sense and have a manifold of other roles and spheres of
interaction: they are moral beings developing their own conception of a moral
good and enacting their purposes and life projects; they are independent
consumers, they own and exchange private property and they are family
members and citizens. Additionally, they can choose—and change—their
professional occupation. With so many distinct roles and spheres, it can hardly
be said that their membership in an estate dominates all aspects of their lives,
making them incapable of conceiving of themselves in any other way than as
instances of their estate or professional group.
Marx’s main misgiving must be that Hegel turns individuals into cogs in a
machine—not so much because they are incapable of independent thought, but
because the machinery does not enable them to act on their critical insights.
Hegel certainly proposes in the preface of the Philosophy of Right that the structure
of the state must justify its existence to ‘free thinking’ (PR: 11/14). That is to say,
the philosophical reader of his book must be able to understand the state, and
Hegel hopes that she will become convinced that Hegel is indeed expounding a
rational social order. But where is the scrutiny of the state, the criticism of a given
conception of the common good located within the state? Individuals as moral
subjects can completely question the social order (PR: §138, 166) and formulate
their own conception of the universal good. Yet Hegel defines ‘morality’ as the
sphere of uncoordinated individual actions, which, precisely because they are
uncoordinated, cannot affect the social order (and even if they could, moral
subjects only follow their own private conception of the universal good and lack
any secure standard or communicative method to determine what is right).
As consumers and private property owners, individuals do not make demands on
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the state, and as members of the estates they either pursue their own egoistic
group interests or need to be dedicated to the given aims of the state as civil
servants (cf. PR: §294, 332f.). (Unlike the collective individuals envisioned by
Marx, those bureaucrats also lack any practical experience of what is of concern
in their society.)
That Hegel turns individuals into cogs in a machine is not only or primarily
problematic because human beings ought to be different, namely, thinking beings
who act with consideration. It is also problematic because a state of ants is
governed by instinct rather than reasoning and critical discussion. If human
beings act as if they were animals or parts of machinery, no critical reflection on
state affairs can happen or, at least, can have an effect on the state. After all, if
individuals cannot formulate the universal good and critically evaluate the social
system, who can? One needs to suppose either a machine maker—God or a
rational and benevolent dictator—or some kind of unguided yet rational
mechanism. It thus remains questionable how the social structure that Hegel
proposes can be properly rational unless it is rational to and for individuals and
can be challenged by them.
IV. Universal good and particular interests
The discussion so far suggests that Marx’s worry is the following: Within Hegel’s
conception of the state, individuals contribute to state affairs as members of
estates. Yet, in this role, they are necessarily unable to act on their critical insights
about the state and their roles, because they are either institutionally obliged to do
whatever the state demands, or they are merely concerned with their egoistic
group interests rather than the universal good.
It is time to turn to the second and third forms through which Hegel
enables individuality within state affairs: (2) the representation of particular
interests; and (3) his conception of the common good. Interpreters usually focus
on civil servants to salvage the idea of a universal good in Hegel, just as Marx
does. However, the key question is whether the pursuing of particular interests by
business-people and landowners cannot at least partly coincide with ensuring the
rationality of the state. Of course, one can argue, as Marx does, that it is
impossible to make a relevant input to the public good by criticizing the state for
not furthering one’s particular interests. However, this claim is based on the
implicit assumption that the public good must be something beyond individuals’
interests. If the universal good were independent of the individuals’ differing
interests, then Marx would be right to conclude, as Avineri suggests, that the
relation of economic groups to the state are a ‘sin against the state’s presumed
claim to express the universal’ (1972: 104). And Marx would be right to demand
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that everyone should participate in the state in the manner in which civil servants
do, dedicating oneself to the public good completely, so that all differences of
interests disappear (MEW 1: 253, cf. 284).
The estates certainly represent particular forms in which individuals are
universal in the additional sense that individuals belong to a particular universal,
i.e., a particular professional group. Hegel could be proposing that the estates
‘mediate’ between civil society and the state in that they provide a first sense of
belonging, which is then transferred to the nation as a whole when one acts as a
patriotic citizen (cf. Bowman 2012: 50f.). However, this neither explains why the
estates are represented in the ‘estates assembly’, nor why Hegel opposes a
democracy, where individuals count as equal votes rather than distinct
professionals.5
In fact, the whole idea of a ‘particular universal being’ that Hegel develops
would be a sham. The proposition that individuals identify with the social in a
particular manner would be a means of tricking individuals into identifying with
something that is actually completely unrelated to their particular interests and
needs. The group interests and estates would be a mere make-believe, making
individuals think that their group interests matter while actually they do not. The
estates as a mere stepping stone on the way to patriotism would serve the
purpose of overcoming individuality and social differences, rather than including
those differences within state affairs. The universal good, for its part, would be
something abstract and empty, something beside the particular interests, needs,
and relations of individuals. The state and the public good it provides would be
what Hegel calls a ‘particular universal’ in the negative sense of a whole that does
not contain the particularities (e.g., interests and individuals) it is meant to
contain.
I have proposed as point (3) that Hegel’s argument must be different. It
only makes sense to propose that estates and professional groups are presenting
their interests in the ‘assembly of estates’ if their interests are part of the universal
good or what the state aims at bringing about. The individual as a particular
universal being must be accompanied by a universal that contains particularity, i.e.
a universal good that contains particular interests. In Hegelian terminology,
this is called a ‘concrete universal’ (see Baumann 2011). In fact, I propose, the
aims of the state and its rationality consist in nothing but uniting individuals in an
organic social system to the effect that different social groups or ‘organs’ are
related in a mutually beneficial manner. The universal good is certainly more than
the mass of particular interests, but this ‘more’ only consists in the systematic and
harmonious organization of those interests, which as such elevates them into
parts of a system Hegel considers rational.
This is a rather novel interpretation. As mentioned in the introduction to
this article, most interpreters propose that the universal good excludes particular
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interests. Pippin, Patten, Franco and Taylor make this claim, as do even
Neuhouser and Hardimon. Beiser is a rare exception, as he points out that the
plurality of interests is an important aspect of Hegel’s organicist conception of
the state (Beiser 2005: 242); but even he primarily regards state institutions as the
organs of the state (253). And he does not make the point that the universal good
would remain abstract or empty unless it consisted of nothing but the organic
interrelation of particular interests.
Hegel proposes repeatedly that the organs of the state are not primarily the
state institutions, but the estates (PR: §302A, 343).6 Hegel writes, for example:
It is not in their unorganic form as singular human beings as
such (in the democratic mode of voting), but as organic
moments, as estates, that they enter upon that participation [in
the state]; a power or activity within the state shall never appear
and act in a formless, unorganic shape, i.e. out of the principle
of maniness and mere numbers [Menge] (E3: §544, 144/343).
Moreover, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel also opposes ‘implanting in the
organism of the state a democratic element devoid of rational form’ (PR: §308,
347), and argues that individuals must enter the state as members of the estates.
In an early political piece, Hegel opposes an organicist state to a mechanistic or
‘machine’ state (VD: 22/481): The latter is a ‘spiritless’ administrative state where
a ‘formless mass’ of atomistic individuals is ‘regulated from above’ (VD: 25/
484). The rulers feel an ‘illiberal jealousy of the independent command and
organization of an estate, corporation etc.’ (VD: 22/481) and do not allow for
‘the participation of one’s own will in universal affairs’ (VD: 23/482).
If Hegel indeed demands that the state should be an organism in the sense
expounded here, then this affects Marx’s worry in two respects. In fact, one can
say that it changes, in two respects, the sense of rationality that is at play, both
regarding the individual’s rational and critical stance toward society and the
rationality of the social order and the universal good it furthers. First, it is not
necessary that everybody be like a civil servant as Marx suggests—dedicating
herself to the common good rather than her particular (group) interests.
Nor does one have to suppose, as Neuhouser (2002: 202, cf. 130f.) does, that
only an elite is able to know the universal good, namely civil servants without any
interests of their own. To have an insight into the universal good does not
require taking a distance from one’s particular interests and analysing society with
due detachment. Rather, the very defence of one’s particular interests contributes
to the harmonious coordination of interests, which, if done successfully, is
the universal good. Being an egoist and pursuing the common good coincide—if
one aims at furthering one’s own interests within a harmonious interrelation
of interests.
Charlotte Baumann
73
Second, the universal good and, in fact, the rationality of the state are
structures that involve particular interests, rather than consisting in some content,
ideal or norm divorced from those interests. It is notable that Hegel uses the
terms formless, unorganic, and irrational almost interchangeably in the above-
cited passages. The reason is certainly that the rational form, the famous absolute
form that Hegel develops over the course of his Logic, includes the organism as a
key element. Even though it is impossible to include any sufficient discussion of
Hegel’s Logic here, it may be supposed that the very organic organization of
different interests is as such rational for Hegel, the actualization of a rational
structure. The public good requires doing what is rational. The public good thus
does not consist in a content beside the interests of individuals; it is nothing but
the rational and organic structuring of those very interests.
V. Problems with an organic conception of the social good
It is clear that such an interpretation faces at least two serious challenges. First, an
organic conception of the state does not necessarily empower individuals. In fact,
Hegel’s organicism is usually read in the opposite manner, namely as a way of
turning individuals into ‘bearers’ of social functions (to use Marx’s terminology).
To make matters worse, Hegel speaks not only of the organism of the state, but
also of its self-willing and self-conscious ‘subjectivity’ (PR: §270, 290f.; §257, 275).
I have argued above that Hegel salvages individuality by allowing individuals to
identify with particular groups and making demands on that basis. One could,
however, propose the opposite and claim that Hegel is denying their individuality
and reducing them to aspects of the state-organism or means for the ends of the
state-subject. Hegel could salvage individuality by turning human beings into
distinct functions within a state—which certainly makes them individual in the
sense of distinguishable by means of their distinct social roles, but deprives them of
individuality in the stronger sense of a particular personality developed in their
interactions with others. Hegel’s insistence that individuals must be socially
distinguishable—which was presented as an advantage over Marx’s position
above—could entail a denial of individual self-determination, the free and social
shaping of one’s own individuality.
The second concern relates to the rational social order and the possibility of
criticism mentioned above. Criticizing the fact that one’s particular interests are
not being met can certainly be a relevant critique of society, if the coordination of
interests is part and parcel of the public good, as was argued above. However, the
question remains as to whether one can also criticize the very idea of a social
organism, rather than whether the organ with which one is associated is receiving
all its necessary lifeblood. If the criticism upon which individuals can act
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concerns mostly the improvement of the social organism rather than the worth
of such a system, then the question arises: on what basis can the organism as a
whole be said to be rational?
Let us turn to the first concern. There is one key difference between my
interpretation and critical accounts of the organism. Critics suppose that the
organism distributes pre-given functions to individuals and groups. Individuals only
have the function of actualizing or maintaining the predetermined, rational structure
and given order of the state. On my reading, on the contrary, Hegel argues that the
interests and interactions that individuals already have should be organized in an
organic or mutually beneficial manner. Additionally, the organism is accompanied by
the notion of collective subjectivity in Hegel, where the members of the ‘estates
assembly’ (as the collective subject) oversee and regulate their own objective or
social relations so as to ensure that they are truly organic and mutually beneficial.
On my reading, Hegel is supposing that social relations always acquire some pattern
as a matter of fact and there are always different roles played by different individuals
or groups. The most rational social order is the one where not only individuals have
to abide by the standards of their roles and social norms, but inversely those roles
are shaped by and negotiated between social groups.
The above-cited passages support my interpretation. Hegel claims that the
organism enables existing economic groups to participate in state affairs. He does
not claim, inversely, that the idea of an organism or self-differentiated whole leads
to the creation of functions, which individuals subsequently have to fulfil. The
interpretative disagreement thus regards the relation of matter and form in Hegel:
Is Hegel applying a specific, supposedly rational form to social relations like a
stencil or mould, forcing matter (in this case, human beings and their relations)
into a shape that is alien to it? Or is the form meant to pick up on the matter’s own
form, organizing the existing groups and types of individuals (namely their existing
differences and interrelations) into a coherent and mutually beneficial system.
(A similar question can be asked regarding the subjectivity of the state: Does
Hegel have a specific shape in mind, ‘unity in difference’ or self-consciousness,
which ought to be realized in social relations? Or is Hegel’s definition of
state-subjectivity picking up on a factual aspect of statehood? If there is a
functioning state, society is by definition a self-determining subject insofar as the
society or state, represented by the government, makes the laws it follows. If this
is Hegel’s basic thought, the question then turns out to be how the modern
state-subject he endorses differs from other historical states, like the benevolent
dictatorship Hegel associates with Ancient China. There are good reasons to
believe that, unlike Ancient China, the modern state is a collective subject for
Hegel, where individuals collectively make laws in the estates assembly. This view
is not only supported by the fact that Hegel regards the Greek polis as the first
state proper,7 but because he claims in his Logic that subject and object of
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absolute subjectivity must be identical, i.e. the ones who regulate social
interactions and must be identical to the object of those state-interventions,
namely the citizens or groups and their relations).
While it is impossible to discuss form and matter in Hegel in any sufficient
manner, it can be noted that Hegel first proposes a conception of ‘formed matter’
(WL 2: 454/93f.) in his Logic, claiming that matter has its own form, i.e. given
distinctions, which the relations and the structuring of the form have to take into
account. In fact, he develops this question in different versions throughout his
Logic and the argument culminates with the transition from the external end to life
or the organism. The basic point is that imposing a purpose, structure or design on
something else is not only “violent” (WL 2: 746f./452f. cf. 721/421), but also
bound to fail, since one merely represses rather than incorporates the distinctions
and properties the matter had in its own right. A truly all-encompassing or
‘absolute form’ cannot consist in the imposition of a pre-given shape or structure;
rather it must consist in nothing but the structured relations of given matter, like
the organism which is nothing but organic interrelation organs establish among
themselves. In the passages quoted in section IV, Hegel opposes the idea that
individuals are a ‘formless mass’ (VD: 25/484) that must be formed by the state;
he opposes the view that human beings should participate in public affairs in a
‘formless, unorganic shape’ as ‘mere numbers’ of votes (E3: §544, 144/343).
Individuals, while being the matter of state regulation, also have a form for Hegel,
namely given distinctions and interests. To a large extent, the rational state is
nothing but the organic interrelation of those interests.
Let us then turn to the second concern: On what basis does Hegel claim that
the type of state he describes is the best state possible? If an organic order is best
for Hegel because his Logic shows it to be, this may trigger another of Marx’s
worries closely linked to the previous discussion: Hegel seems to be applying to the
state a logic that is external to it and which cannot therefore prove the latter’s
worth (MEW 1: 213). Additionally, even if the Logic helps reveal something that is
at work within a social order, Adorno’s remark still applies, namely that ‘the
supposedly higher concept of spirit has to prove itself to the living and actual
spirits of human beings’ (Adorno 2006: 70). The state has to be rational not only in
some metaphysical sense, but also to and for human beings. Or does it not?
Hegel’s logical metaphysics suggests that there are a limited number of
structures that are at work in the world and which solve the problem of unity in
difference, plurality and oneness, in objectively better or worse ways. The Logic
analyses structures in the abstract that are also at work in mind-independent
nature, human thinking and social relations and allows for their evaluation.
The organism, and, in fact, absolute subjectivity, are central elements of the best
form of organizing diversity into a coherent whole, according to Hegel. This
means: Hegel’s logical discussion of the organism is inherently linked to the
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problem of individuality or individual differences and how they can be allowed to
flourish and interact in a beneficial manner.
Does the metaphysical or logical worth of a system (as a solution to the
problem of unity in difference) compel individuals to approve of it or to create
such a system over the course of history? No. Hegel does not suppose any
absolute necessity in the realm of human freedom (cf. VR1: 90/14).8 In other
words, human beings are of course able to organize their lives in a different
manner from the one suggested by Hegel, both individually and collectively.
However, Hegel believes that the most rational thing to do, and what would
enable the greatest amount of freedom, would be to organize society as an
organic state (and, indeed, a collective, absolute subject). For Hegel, modern
individuals are capable of coming to this conclusion, and he is optimistic that
they will. However, their insight is not a necessary condition for the organic state
being the most rational social order. In other words: the worth or legitimacy of an
organic state is metaphysically warranted, but not its existence, since human
beings may fail to recognize its worth.
This certainly sounds problematic. How can something be legitimate
without the approval of its participants? First, one thing needs to be borne in
mind: The social order Hegel proposes enables individual groups to make
specific demands within the assembly of estates, and to oversee and coordinate
their interests to their mutual benefit. The coordination of their interests and
demands is part and parcel of the rational order of the state. In fact, one could
say that Hegel empowers individuals to a much greater extent than they are
empowered in a representative democracy or by means of participating in public
discourse: One person’s vote only minimally affects the outcome of an election;
the disapproval that someone voices rarely has an effect on the social order.
Hegel proposes, on the contrary, that individuals—organized in professional
groupings—should negotiate and make the laws that benefit their interests.
Additionally, Hegel proposes safeguards for personal rights and types of
individuality that do not require or allow for negotiation. And the concept of an
organism, in principle, requires that new types of individuality that emerge will
also have to be included in a harmonious manner.
One could thus try to salvage Hegel by pointing out that individuals are likely
to approve of an organic social order, either because they realize its inherent
worth or because they have the power to ensure that their particular interests are
furthered. However, an insightful point to take away from Hegel’s discussion is
that neither legitimacy nor the universal good should be understood as formal
matters. Legitimacy and the good do not hinge on the fact that individuals
approve or that what the state pursues can be taken to be good for all. The
universal good is a question of content, of what material and other benefits
individuals have and which aspects of their lives they have the power to shape.
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The formality of looking for individual approval of a social order becomes
obvious not only when you consider that it is likely to be an imagined approval in
a hypothetical pre-social condition. (Even non-metaphysical Hegelians basically
suggest that the social order is merely legitimate insofar as present-day individuals
can interpret the history of their norms as having been rational.) Even if it were
possible to create a social order purely out of the collective and independent
decision of a people (Hegel believes the French Revolution was closest to this
scenario), such an attempt is necessarily flawed for Hegel, precisely because
freedom is merely a matter of form, consisting in the fact that individuals
collectively decided, rather than what they decided on. One can only continue
living this freedom of choice by constantly recreating new moments of free
choice, continually revolutionizing society—which Hegel famously regarded as
the problem of the French Revolution. To realize the greatest degree of freedom,
Hegel suggests, individuals should want a social system that is inclusive and
harmonious, where they have the institutionalized means for furthering their
group interests and they collectively oversee the overall system. Individuals can
thus shape their social roles and interactions, while other forms of individuality
that do not require negotiation are guaranteed their free expression. The
universal good consists in nothing but such a system.
Conclusion
In contrast to the early Marx, Hegel focuses on diversity or individual distinctions
between human beings (and groups), rather than on individuals as persons. He
believes that such distinctions can only exist for oneself and for others if they are
socially defined. While it is impossible for all individuals to take part in law
making, Hegel argues that these (group) distinctions can and ought to be
represented. Hegel chooses one’s labour as the distinction that should be
represented in the ‘assembly of estates’. The reason is certainly that one’s work is
an important part in an individual’s everyday life and that different labours are so
systematically intertwined that it is impossible to change your own working
conditions and relations without changing those of others as well.
Even though Marx validates individuals by demanding that they should
personally take part in law making, his argument ultimately suggests that
individuals do not have particular interests and that the universal good is what
each individual would want if she were to identify completely with society or
humanity as a whole. In a contradictory way, Marx validates individuals by
encouraging them to lose their individuality. Hegel, for his part, agrees that the
universal good is more than the mass of individual interests. And yet he proposes
that the universal good is more in the sense of a harmonious organization of
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those interests. In order for individuality to be validated, distinct interests must
be recognized and coordinated, thereby formulating the universal good.
While Marx’s model relies on the idea of approval to make the universal good
legitimate, Hegel suggests that it is not primarily a matter of approval, but of
empowerment of interests and of the material and other benefits for individuals.
Hegel is well aware that social roles limit individual freedom, requiring individuals
to act out a role, as Marx criticizes. However, roles and patterns of interactions are
unavoidable for Hegel. Freedom can only be ensured if individuals can shape their
roles and the patterns of interactions by means of negotiation with others. This is
more empowering than appealing to the individual’s approval of her social system.
Even in the best case of a direct democracy, a minority ‘no’-vote will have no effect
on the social system—while a coordination of interests requires taking all interests
into account in a systematic manner.
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Notes
1 Abbreviations used (I have taken the liberty of amending the English translation where
I saw fit):
Works by Hegel
E3 = Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, trans. W. Wallace (New York: Cosimo 2008)/Enzyklopädie der
philosophischen Wissenschaften, volume III (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986).
PR = Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991)/Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970).
VG = Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (Mineola NY: Dover Publications, 1956)/
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986).
VD = Hegel, ‘The German Constitution’, in Political Writings, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1971)/‘Die Verfassung Deutschlands’ in Frühe Schriften
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971).
VR1 = Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, volume 1, trans. R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson
and J. M. Stewart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)/Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der
Religion, volume 1 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986).
WL2 = Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanity Books, 1969)/
Wissenschaft der Logik, volume II (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969).
Works by Marx
MEW 1: 201–336 = Marx, ‘Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie’, in Marx Engels
Werke, volume 1 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1956).
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MEW 1: 347–77 = Marx, ‘Zur Judenfrage’, in Marx Engels Werke, volume 1 (Berlin: Dietz
Verlag, 1956).
MEW 1: 378–81 = Marx, ‘Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung’, in Marx
Engels Werke, volume 1 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1956).
MEW 1: 392–410 = Marx, ‘Kritische Randglossen’, in Marx Engels Werke, volume 1 (Berlin:
Dietz Verlag, 1956).
MEW 3 = Marx and Engels, ‘Die deutsche Ideologie’, in Marx Engels Werke, volume 3 (Berlin:
Dietz Verlag, 1990).
MEW 17 = Marx, ‘Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich’, in Marx Engels Werke, volume 17 (Berlin:
Dietz Verlag, 1990).
MEW 23 = Marx, ‘Das Kapital. Band 1’, in Marx Engels Werke, volume 23 (Berlin: Dietz
Verlag, 2005).
MEW 40 = Marx, ‘Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte’, in Marx Engels Werke,
volume 40 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1990).
MEW 42 = Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, Marx Engels Werke, volume 42
(Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1983).
2 Hardimon suggests that individual interests are only furthered by the state in the sense that
they are given their own sphere, namely civil society.
3 For Hegel’s and Marx’s opposition to liberalism, see Sayers 2007.
4 Cf. Houlgate 2005, 204f.
5 For Hegel’s criticism of democracy see also Brooks 2007, 116ff.
6 Hegel is discussing the estates in this passage. The relevant sentence should be translated as:
‘When organized as an organism, the mass attains its interests in a legitimate and orderly
manner.’ (Nisbet translates this somewhat misleadingly as ‘When it becomes part of the
organism, the mass…’)
7 Hegel claims that China and India precede history proper, as they merely present elements
of statehood (VG: 116/147). The organicist or beautiful state of the Greek polis is the first
state proper.
8 Even in his Philosophy of Religion, Hegel insists that ‘the caprice, the perversity, the indolence
of individuals may interfere with the necessity of the universal spiritual nature’ (VR1: 90/14).
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